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Traditional healers in Cameroun are paid on an outcome-contingent basis, where
payments are linked to the recovery of the patient. On the other hand, organizational
providers (government clinics and hospitals and church-based clinics and hospitals)
are paid a fixed fee at the time of consultation. Is this 'custom' of payment method at
the traditional healer a response to a problem of imperfect information in the supply of
medical care? Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) suggest that share-cropping is a response to
imperfect information in the supply of factor inputs owned by land-lords and tenants.
Because different crops require different levels of inputs, one form of contract might be
particularly appropriate for some crops but not others. We suggest that contingent-
payment contracts are appropriate for some health production technologies and that
fixed fee contracts are appropriate for other technologies, where a technology in health
care is the medical response indicated by a set of presenting conditions.
We fit a contractual model of health care demand to data on observed patterns
of provider and contract choice using a Conditional Logit. Effort exerted on behalf
of the patient's health is unobservable and is therefore only delivered according to
the incentives that exist within the implicit contract between patient and provider.
Patients create an approximate market for medical effort by choosing between discrete
contract types.
Institutions and organizations play an essential role in the creation of credible
quality. With simulation we show that the government can greatly reduce transaction
costs (and increase net utility) by specifically recognizing its role as an organization
within the context of the institution of modern health care.
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1 Introduction
Traditional healers in Cameroun are paid on an outcome-contingent basis, where payments
are linked to the recovery of the patient. On the other hand, organizational providers
(government clinics and hospitals and church-based clinics and hospitals) are paid a fixed
fee at the time of consultation. Is this 'custom' of payment method at the traditional healer
a response to a problem of imperfect information in the supply of medical care? Eswaran
and Kotwal (1985) suggest that share-cropping is a response to imperfect information
in the supply of factor inputs owned by land-lords and tenants. Because different crops
require different levels of inputs, one form of contract might be particularly appropriate for
some crops but not others. We suggest that contingent-payment contracts are appropriate
for some health production technologies and that fixed fee contracts are appropriate for
other technologies, where a technology in health care is the medical response indicated by
a set of presenting conditions.
There are distinct patterns in the types of diseases that are reported at traditional
and organizational providers (Leonard 1998). Diseases reported at traditional healers are
characterized by high returns to medical and patient effort. We fit a contractual model
of health care demand to data on observed patterns of provider and contract choice from
the South West Province of Cameroun. Effort exerted on behalf of the patient's health is
unobservable and is therefore only delivered according to the incentives that exist within
the implicit contract between patient and provider. Patients create an approximate market
for medical effort by choosing between discrete contract types.
We extend the Grossman (1975) model of investment in health capital by assuming
imperfect factor markets as developed in Eswaran and Kotwal (1985). Both provider
and patient play a bilateral-effort principal-agent game as in Holmstrom (1982). With
this relatively simple specification of incentives we show that, because diseases require a
different mix of patient and medical inputs in their treatment, different types of contracts
are better for different diseases.
This paper focuses on patients' choices between the five most commonly visited types of
providers. The government of Cameroun runs clinics and hospitals. In addition there are
a variety of clinics and hospitals run by churches. Both government and mission hospitals
are similarly staffed and equipped, and both types of clinics are similarly staffed and
equipped. All government centers are similarly managed and mission centers are similarly
managed. Hospitals and clinics differ according to skill and government and mission
facilities differ according to management. The fifth choice are traditional healers who
remain popular among all ages and classes of rural Cameroun. We interviewed traditional
healers1 and examined secondary sources for information about the practice of traditional
medicine2. Traditional healers have very different incentives than other providers because
they accept payment for services contingent on a successful outcome, whereas the other
four providers only accept fixed payments. Incentives to provide effort at clinics and
hospitals come in the form of penalties from employers when standards for care are not
met. Mission centers have the potential to impose significantly higher penalties than do
their government counterparts. Each provider offers a different mix of skill and incentives
to provide effort.
We follow the convention of North (1990) and use the term institutions to refer to
rules or conventions of interaction between players. Organizations, on the other hand,
"are groups of individuals bound by some common purpose" and are seen as players
within the context of institutions. The provision of health care is governed by two very
different institutions, within which our five providers operate. Thus we view mission
and government health services as organizations that operate within the institution of
modern medicine and traditional healers as individuals who operate within the institution
of traditional medicine.
Our data include the characteristics of the disease or conditions3 from which patients
*By traditional healers we mean rural health practitioners who run practices that resemble health
practices that existed before the spread of 'western' medicine into the rural areas. We do not imply that
all traditional healers use herbal medicines, nor that no non-traditional practitioners use herbal medicines.
Our distinction is by method of practice not by types of medicines used.
2For details of the interviews see Leonard (1998). Secondary sources were Korse et al. (1989), Baerts
(1989), Edwards (1983), Oyenye and Orubuloye (1985), Lasker (1981), Staugard (1985), Gelfand, Mari,
Drummond and Ndemera (1985) and Conco (1972).
3A11 illness episodes are characterized as a series of symptoms and complaints, however for simplicity's
sake we will often refer to these as diseases, even though we can never be sure from what disease a person
was suffering.
suffered as well as characteristics of the patient and the expected costs at each practitioner.
By assuming that choices are made based on expected net utility we use a conditional logit
structural estimation to recover the parameters of the production-of-health-investment
function as well as the parameters of the contracts between patients and providers for
the delivery of medical and patient effort. The results of our estimation illustrate how the
characteristics of disease affect the choice of contract, how the characteristics of the patient
affect her ability to transform health care into health, and how the opportunity cost of
healthy time affects the relative weight of costs and incentives in the choice of health care
provider. We conclude that patients choose a provider because the contract under which
medical effort is delivered is appropriate to the condition from which the patient suffers.
The contractual estimation allows us to investigate some potential government policies.
We find that policies that directly address the transaction costs created by asymmetric
information are the policies that create the greatest increase in utility for the population
at the lowest cost to the government.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we outline our model of health pro-
duction. We develop an explicit characterization of the contract available at each provider
and the levels of effort that the patient can expect at each provider. In Section 3 we dis-
cuss the data that we collected in Cameroun. A structural estimation is presented and the
results are discussed in Section 4. In Section 5 we present the results of policy simulations.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Health care as a production good
Patients balance the cost of visiting a particular practitioner against the expected benefit
of health care. We follow Grossman (1975) and model the benefit of health care as an
increase in health stock. Health stock determines time available for work and leisure. This
stock depreciates over time, can be increased by investment in health care and is subject to
negative shocks from illness. In our model individuals purchase health care because they
have received a negative shock to their health stock that creates a demand for investment
in health.
X is the outcome of investment in health care; the change in the number of healthy-
hours. The unconditional probability of X is given by its distribution function $(X; fi, <j&),
and is an increasing function of /i. /z is a function of the effort of the practitioner, a, the
effort of the patient, 6, characteristics of the disease ipk, characteristics of the practitioner
tpj, and characteristics of the patient ipi where k is the disease index, j the practitioner
index and i the individual index; \x = f(a, 6, T/^, ipj, ipi). The standard error Ok of X is a
function of the disease characteristics only.
Payments to health care practitioners differ across providers but can involve fixed
fees (paid before a consultation), an outcome-contingent fee (paid after the outcome is
observed) and drug costs. Traditional healers charge a fixed fee and negotiate with the
patient over a schedule of further payments before the treatment begins. Traditional
healers do not charge for drugs. Government and church-operated clinics and hospitals
charge a fixed fee for consultation and charge for all drugs administered.
We simplify the contingent payment to the traditional healer as a share of the value
of the outcome, thus rjkWiX, where cji is the opportunity cost of healthy time and rjk is
a fixed share such that 0 < rjk < 1. Drug costs for traditional healers are 0 and rjk — 0
for all providers except the traditional healer.
Income for patient i, treated at provider j for illness condition k is
Y! = (1 - r,k)<OiX ~ (fcj + dcjk + t*j) (1)
where fcj are fixed fees, dcjk are drug costs and tcij is the travel cost. The travel cost is a
function of the individual (origin) and the practitioner visited (destination), the drug cost
is a function of the practitioner and the disease, and the fixed cost is a function only of
the practitioner. The income of the practitioner is the sum of all payments by the patient,
not including travel costs.
(2)
The patient is risk neutral and has utility only over expected income and disutility of
effort, where the mean of the outcome is fi, and d(b) is the disutility of effort.
E(Up)= {l-rjk)oJifi{a,b,iP) - d(b) - (j'Cj + dcjk + ftfr) (3)
retained earning increase disutility costs
2.1 Unobservable inputs
The demand for health investment depends on the price of the factor inputs. However,
we claim that there are imperfect markets for patient effort and practitioner effort. The
patient-doctor interchange is a classic example of moral hazard (Arrow (1963), Arrow
(1985), Dranove and White (1987)) because the patient is unable to evaluate what the
doctor is doing for her sake. Both principal and patient effort affect the outcome of
a disease episode. Since the outcome of health investment is stochastic, effort cannot be
imputed from the outcome. Every outcome is compatible with every level of input, though
outcomes do give information about the likelihood of any given level of effort having been
exerted.
In the specification we have introduced, the patient and the traditional healer both
have incentives to exert effort, so although effort cannot be purchased in a perfect market,
a contract exists for its provision. The provision of effort on the part of government and
mission health centers is not quite as obvious.
2.2 Organizational penalties
Both government and mission health centers operate to serve the health of their clients;
they are not profit making entities. Thus, though the practitioner does not have a direct
incentive to exert effort, his employer has an incentive to induce effort. The employer of the
practitioner does not observe the outcome of health care, but does observe other outcomes
that give information about the effort of the provider. Practitioners produce both health
for the patient and what we call organizational quality. This second output is observed
by the employer. Records are kept of the various activities that go into producing health.
Typically a selection of records are examined during a site visit. The patients' symptoms
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and complaints are part of all records and therefore procedures and records should follow
protocols developed for each set of complaints. If a particular record or collection of records
is determined to be in violation of standards the practitioner is punished in accordance
with the gravity of the deviation. This method of ensuring quality is what we refer to as
a penalty-based scheme.
When an organization can force a practitioner to produce high organizational quality
it is also forcing the practitioner to exert medical effort, even though the patient's health is
never observed. This system of incentives is very different from that of traditional healers.
Because the employer does not observe the outcome of the treatment, the decision of
whether or not to punish, or by how much, is independent of the effort of the patient.
The probability of being visited and observed, or of a record or set of records being ex-
amined, is fixed within and varies between organizations. Once the data from a particular
consultation is observed, the organizational quality, Qk(a,ipk), 1S known with certainty.
This is then compared to the required quality, Q\ (which may differ by condition) and the
punishment is proportional to this difference. The expected value of the penalty is
9{a, fpkJ) = Pj • kj (Ql - Qk(a, tpk)) (4)
where ipk are characteristics of the disease, Pj is the probability, for any given organization
j , of a record being examined and kj is the baseline penalty for organization j . Pj and kj
cannot be identified separately thus we refer to the product as Kj.
We can construct the utility of the practitioner (who is risk neutral) and see that
both traditional healers and providers at government and mission clinics have incentives
to exert effort.
Generally Um = r ^ o ^ a , 6, ^) + dcjk + fcj -g{a,ipk,j)- c(a) (5)
contingent fee drugs fixed penalty disutility
Healer Um = rjkuin(a, 6, \j)) + fcj — c(a)
Organizations Um = dcjk + fcj — g(a,ipk,j) — c(a)
Penalties axe important in our analysis because they provide the incentive to exert effort.
We hypothesize that the penalty basis at mission centers is larger than at government
centers (where all practitioners are protected from the most severe penalties because they
are civil servants) and therefore practitioners at mission centers exert more effort for every
condition than their government counterparts.
If there were perfect information about efforts the patient could choose those levels of
both patient and medical effort that equated marginal cost to marginal benefit. However
since neither effort is observable the patient will choose the level of her own effort that
maximizes her utility given her expectation of the practitioner's effort. Medical effort at
organizational providers is determined independent of the patient's actions. Traditional
healers choose the optimal level of effort given their expectation of the patient's effort.
b* G *c&£ax (1 - rjk)u>irta't 6, V) - fcj - dcjk - tey - d(b) (6)
a* G ta^axuHrjkii(a, &', V) - g{a, faj) + fCj + dcjk - c(a) (7)
where b' is the practitioner's expectation of the patient's effort and a' is the patient's
expectation of the practitioner's effort. Note that rjk and Kj are never both greater than
zero (Kj • rjk = 0 Vj). The solution of this system of equations is the pair of efforts
{a*, b*} such that a' = a* and b' = b*.
2.3 Production in teams with unobservable effort
This presentation has a strong parallel to the principle-agent model of production in teams
advanced by Holmstrom (1982). His work shows that some relatively strong restrictions on
the model are required in order to characterize the solution as a Nash non-cooperative game
(i.e. with reaction functions as first order conditions). Here we explore those necessary
specifications on the distribution of X.
Increases in health stock are produced by the joint effort of two agents; the patient and
the practitioner. These two players form the team. We introduce a third player, the super-
principal, who declares incentive-compatible efforts for both agents (efforts that solve the
system of equations 6 and 7), and pays them according to a contract. The super-principal
does not exert effort but has the task of interpreting the information that she receives
and executing the contract according to this information. To characterize the information
she receives we need to make some assumptions about the distribution of the outcome of
health investment.
We assume that there are two possible outcomes of any episode of illness, the patient
can return to her previous state of good health or the patient can remain in her current
state of health; recovery and no change. Thus X = jj, for full recovery and X = /i = 0 for no
change. The probability of either outcome is characterized by two binomial distributions,
the full effort distribution 4>Mi and the no effort distribution 0none. At full effort (meant
to invoke the idea that both parties do everything possible without regard to cost) the
probability of full recovery is ph, and at no effort the probability of full recovery is p\.
A technology e combines these two possible distributions. The expected outcome of
health care is a spanning, by e, of the no effort and the full effort distributions.
E(X) = J2 (c • prob(X = I | fa) + (1 - e) • prob(X = J | <£none))
J=0,/2
Note that we can arbitrarily assign a new variable \x = e • p, and rewrite the above as
E(X) = V (^ • prob(X = I I fa) + (1 - ^) • prob(X = I | <£none)) (8)
simplifies to jJ>{ph — Pi) + Pi • P- The expected increase in the number of healthy
hours available for work is the probability of full recovery if no effort is exerted plus the
premium on effort (ph—Pl) times the joint effort exerted.
Since the distribution of the outcome is a convex combination of two distribution func-
tions it meets the Linear Distribution Function Condition (LDFC) as developed in Hart
and Holmstrom (1987). LDFC implies that if we were to map out the information set avail-
able to the super-principal for each possible action of one agent (fixing the other agent's
action) the set would be convex. The super-principal can only assign a unique payment
(or expected payment) to each outcome, since the outcome is the only information she
gathers. If the outcome is a convex set of the agent's effort then the marginal change in
payments is guaranteed to have at most one tangency to the utility of the agent4. This
allows us to characterize the incentive compatibility constraints as first order conditions.
Henceforth, however, we will represent the expected outcome of health by /i, as if pu were
arbitrarily close to 1 and p\ were arbitrarily close to 05.
In the case of the interaction between a traditional healer and the patient the super-
principal is not an actual entity6. In the case of mission and government organizations the
super-principal is the employer of the practitioner and observes certain other outcomes that
depend only on the effort of the practitioner. The super-principal maximizes the utility of
the patient subject to total cost and the participation constraint of the practitioner. Note
that all actions must be incentive compatible, even the actions of the patient. Thus the
problem can be represented as
£ w ~ (fcj + dcjk + toy) - d(b) - T (9)
subject to
a* E aieaaxrjkpiii + fCj + dcjk - c(a) + T (I.C. medical) (10)
b* G "S™** (l _ rjk)umA - (fCj + dcjk + tey) - d(b) (I.C. patient) (11)
rjkVitJ. + fcj + dcjk - c(a) + T = Vm (I.R. medical) (12)
(1 - rjk)ui/i - (fcj + dcjk + tdj) - d(b) > Vp (LR. patient) (13)
4For a distribution such as the normal, when the agent increases his effort the probability of any given
outcome X, first increases and then decreases and the probability does not map out a convex set. The
super-principal can align incentives so as to force the agent to chose an action whose marginal disutility
of effort is exactly equal to the marginal change in payments but for the normal distribution there will be
two actions that satisfy this condition and the principal can never force the agent to choose one over the
other.
5Dropping pi • p, is easily justified since, as a constant, it will fall out of the first order conditions and,
since it does not vary by practitioner (the benefit to doing nothing is the same at all practitioners) will
fall out of the conditional logit estimation. The factor (ph — pi) is dropped anticipating data limitations.
We collected data on the variance of the outcome of health as a whole (see section 3) not the variance of
the full and no effort distributions. This simplification, though unfortunate, is not overly restrictive given
that we assume both actors are risk-neutral and have utility only over the first, not the second or higher
order moments.
6The super-principal can be represented by custom; custom might dictate incentive compatible actions
of both parties in each case as well as the optimal share.
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where T is the transfer from the super-principal to the practitioner, Vp is the reservation
utility of the patient and Vm is the reservation utility of the practitioner. The practitioner's
individual rationality constraint (I.R.) is binding and we can therefore substitute it into
the super-principal's objective function. We have justified the use of the relaxed incentive
compatibility (I.C.) constraints and since all players are risk neutral we can reduce the
problem to maximizing the expectation of the outcome and we get:
r^ab^3 ~ ^H2 ~ t°ij ~ d(b) — c(a) — Vj (9')
subject to
("0
dcjk + tdj) - d(b) > Vp (13')
2.3.1 Balanced budgets
We begin by considering the case of the interaction between the patient and a traditional
healer; Kj = 0. Note that the first best solution from the point of view of the super-
principal is the point where the marginal benefit of effort is equal to its marginal cost;
But the super-principal can only require effort compatible with the incentives of the prac-
titioner and the patient as defined by the incentive compatibility constraints equations 10'
and 11'. 10' and 11' are equal to 14 and 15 if rjk = (1 — rjk) = 1, which it cannot be.
When the payments to the patient and the practitioner must always sum to the value of
the output (the super-principal is required to redistribute all gains from the outcome),
then rp + rm = 1 (in this case (1 — rjk) + rjk = 1) and the principal cannot achieve the
first best solution.
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Proposition 1: A linear sharing rule cannot achieve the full information solution in the
case of unobservable effort. Proof is above.
Given that the full information solution is not obtainable, is the introduction of a
sharing rule an improvement over the solution without a sharing rule?
Proposition 2: With unobservable efforts as above any sharing rule 0 < rjk < 1 gives
a solution strictly superior to either rjk = 0 or rjk = 1. For proof see Appendix A.
We cannot achieve the first-best solution with a sharing rule but we can improve on
the solution that would obtain without a sharing rule.
2.3.2 Unbalanced budgets, Super-Principals and Institutions
Balanced budgets and super-principals are a related concept in this exposition. In a one-
period game two agents could not sustain a contract that did not have a balanced budget.
They might agree to dispose of outcome (by burning money for example) but this would be
renegotiated were such an action ever called for and is therefore not a credible agreement.
When the super-principal is not an actual third party all budgets must be balanced.
If the super-principal is an actual entity she can inject or remove value from the game;
the payments do not need to sum to the total value. By breaking the budget balance the
super-principal can achieve the first best solution to the game. Instead of a sharing rule
{rm,rp}, where rp = 1 — rm, choose rp = 1 and rm = 1. Examining again equations 10'
and 11' it should be clear that such a rule will achieve the first best solution. Note that the
super-principal can then extract the expected value of these payments from the two parties
without changing either incentive compatibility constraint. This is not a balanced budget
because, though the sum of payments might be equal to the total value in expectation,
they do not equal the total value in each case.
In this paper we advance the concept of the institution as a super-principal. The
role of the organization within the institution of modern health care is to break budget
balance and induce effort. They do this by punishing the practitioner. Any punishment
of the practitioner is not a balanced action because the value of the punishment is not
passed on to the patient. The punishment of practitioners through penalties as outlined
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in section 2.2 does not achieve the first best solution because the super-principal never
observes the actual outcome of the treatment. If the super-principal observed the outcome
of treatment and acted in the interests of patients the sharing rule of the traditional healer
would never be superior to the punishment of budget-breaking institutions.
Institutions are also important for the contract offered at the traditional healer. Verifi-
able, not just observable, outcomes are essential to the mechanism of a contingent-payment
contract. If patients can lie about the outcome of treatment a contingent-payment con-
tract cannot be maintained. We discovered that there is a strong institution for the
enforcement of truth-telling. Without exception patients will not lie to traditional healers
about the outcome of treatment for fear that the cure will be revoked by spirits, or that
a far worse illness will befall them (see Leonard (1998)). Traditional healers expressed
very little concern about collecting the money due them and all said that patients were
always honest. Patient believe outcomes can be verified by the super-principal and act
accordingly.
Unobservable efforts introduce an inefficiency in exchange. Health care in Cameroun
exhibits two institutions that address this problem. Neither achieve the full information
solution, but each improves upon the solution in the absence of contracts or institutions.
Eswaran and Kotwal (1985) show, using simulation, that three different agricultural con-
tracts (share-cropping, wage labor and rented land) can co-exist in a situation of imperfect
factor markets and show that each contract dominates the other for certain crops or pro-
duction technologies. Analogously we view treatments for different diseases as different
technologies and show that both fee-for-service (similar to wage labor) and contingent-
payment (similar to share-cropping) can co-exist.
2.4 Functional Forms
To continue we specify functional forms. The expected value of investment in health care
is a Cobb-Douglass production function fj, = {a7rjk)^k{br)i)ak where a^ + jk < 1- Ik is
the responsiveness of a disease to patient effort, -Kjk is the skill of the practitioner, a^ is
the responsiveness of the disease to patient effort and rji is the efficiency of the patient at
13
transforming effort into health.
We chose simple forms for disutility of effort where, c(a) = a and d(b) = b. Recall
the specification of the penalty, <?(a, ?/>&, j ) = Kj (Qfc(a? V>fc)jfc ~~ Qfc(a> V>&))- We chose the
functional form of Qk(o>i W in anticipation of a simple functional specification for a*. &
is a scalar that varies by disease condition.
=ln(a)-C*
For visits to the traditional healer with the preceding functional forms we can reduce
equations 10 and 11 by assuming a Nash non- cooperative equilibrium and get
a* =
- i
, . _ ((1 - r3k)ak)lk-i )
Patient utility is expressed, in equation 18 as a function only of patient, practitioner, and
disease characteristics. Note that utility is a strictly increasing function of the opportunity
cost of time (a^), the patient efficiency at transforming health care into health (77^ ) and
practitioner skill (7^).
E(IP) = (Wjt?i
((1 - rik) akf~™) 1-"*"7*) - (fci + dcjk
A closed form solution for the optimal share, r^*, is not obtainable, but the solution can
be shown to depend only on 7^ and a*.
ik 6 a r ^ M (((1 -
(((1 - r ^
((1 - rjk) a*)1"7*) T r n ^ (19)
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For organizational providers a* is independent of b and characteristics of the patient but
6* does depend on a*. Patient utility is an increasing function of Kj, £&, njk, r\i and U{.
6* = (a












Data on patient behavior in the face of illness were collected in Mbonge sub-division,
in the South-West province of Cameroun. The sub-division is entirely rural. This area
was chosen because of the presence of a German aid project that insured a consistent,
reasonably-priced drug supply in all government health centers and hospitals.
40 villages were randomly chosen and 20 randomly selected households from each vil-
lage were interviewed. Data were collected on all members of the household. There were
681 illness episodes reported within the 1 month recall period out of 4,489 individuals rep-
resented. Of these, 548 visited one of the five types of providers we are studying and we
have complete and consistent data for 535. All reported visits are first contacts. Referrals,
second opinions, and follow-up visits are not included in this analysis. Furthermore we
do not consider normal pregnancy or delivery to be an illness episode. The 'other practi-
tioners' category included (in order of frequency): drug peddlers; pharmacists; neighbors;
private hospitals: private clinics and parastatal hospitals.
3.1 Patient level data
We do not observe the opportunity cost of healthy time, nor the patient's efficiency at
converting health inputs into health. We substitute for these two variables an aggregation
of the data that we do observe and hypothesize is related to the opportunity cost or
efficiency. Ui and T)i are then estimated within the structural estimation.
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We substitute for cjjM individual characteristics wi such that Ui = J2m Wm • u>im with
.. . WM} to be estimated within the structural estimation. W{ includes a constant,
the reported wage converted to a weekly rate and, for individuals who are of working age,
but report no income (mostly housewives) the total family income.
We substitute for rji L individual characteristics e,, such that m = Y^i^l ' eU w^h
{EQ ...EL} to be estimated, e^  includes a constant, the log of family wealth, age, age
squared, gender and dummy variables for occupations. We include the age, gender and
education level of the individual who looked after the patient for episodes involving children
and the old or infirm. When a patient looked after herself these variables reflect her own
characteristics.
3.2 Provider level data
rjk* is determined endogenously in the empirical estimation. All other shares are
fixed at 0. The penalty bases for government and mission centers are determined in the
estimation. Fixed costs are known from the data and since they do not vary by disease
or individual we can assign the known fixed cost to every center. Government clinics and
hospitals have fixed costs over the whole sample; mission costs vary from center to center
and we use the average. Fixed fees for the traditional healer are deduced from average
fees paid at the time of consultation.
3.3 Joint determination
Drug costs dcjk depend on the practitioner and the disease. Travel costs tcij are determined
by the practitioner and the individual, i.e. origin and destination.
3.3.1 Drug Costs
We cannot use the reported cost of drugs as the expected cost of drugs because we do
not observe the cost at centers not visited and we know that drug costs are not the same
across centers, even for the same disease. The cost of drugs at mission centers is higher
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than the cost at government centers because the government subsidizes drugs. The cost
of filling a prescription at hospitals is higher than at clinics because there are more drugs
and diagnostic tests available. The prescription filled at a hospital might be more effective
than that filled at a clinic, and it costs more. Note that at traditional healers the drug
cost is always zero whereas the same disease would require drug purchases at any other
center.
Furthermore there is selection bias in reported drug costs. There is correlation between
the type of disease and the quantity and type of drugs purchased, and individuals choose
centers in part according to the disease. In order to estimate the cost of drugs at each
center we hypothesize that the drug cost is a function of characteristics of the disease and
that costs are related across centers by a fixed ratio.
dCjk=Ak. dck=Ak. n 4n • n eti (23)
n I
dcjk is the cost at any given center, and dck is a numeraire drug cost for each disease.
The cost at each center is related to the numeraire cost by a ratio A^, and the numeraire
cost is a function of individual characteristics and disease characteristics. We set the ratio
between a government center and the numeraire cost to 1. With a large set of observed
drug costs we can estimate dck and Ak. Results of the log-linear regression are reported
in Leonard (1997).
3.3.2 Travel Costs
We have data for each village on the distance and total taxi cost to most major hospitals
and clinics. Taxi costs in this area are determined on a per kilometer basis, depending
on the quality of the road. Thus, using a large set of known taxi costs we have estimated
a taxi cost from every village to the closest of each of the four organizational providers.
Although we have data on distances traveled to visit a traditional healer, we do not know
the location of every traditional healer in the sample area is located so we cannot reliably
calculate the cost of the counter-factual visit. The average distance traveled to visit a
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traditional healer is small so we normalize this distance to zero. Note that though we use
taxi costs, not every patient took a taxi.
3.4 Disease Level Data
We collected information from respondents on the characteristics of the episode from
which they suffered: all symptoms they experienced; the self-declared severity of the
disease; the number of days sick before seeking care; and the number of those days the
patient was bedridden. With these characteristics, the age and sex of the individual and
information about endemic diseases in the area, we carefully considered each case and
then ranked each in the following categories8.
Responsiveness to Medical Effort %
Responsiveness to medical effort is the degree to which outcome depends on the
effort of the practitioner.
Responsiveness to Patient Effort a*
Is there a critical role for the patient in her treatment?
Benefit of skill and capacity Wjk
There are three levels of skill and capacity that patients can choose between, with
the benefit at a higher level facility always at least as high as the benefit at lower
level facilities9.
— Informally trained practitioner These are people who are in the health care pro-
fession and may have practiced for many years, but who never completed a formal
medical training program. Their experience can be sizable but it will not be based
on a foundation of western medical training. Common drugs are available to them.
7
 Symbols such as 7* are represented here as %, for example, to indicate that it will be transformed by
a constant factor in the empirical investigation. Thus 7fc = fli - 7*;.
8A11 coding was blind of provider chosen and diagnosis.
9Patients claim that there axe diseases for which traditional healers have more skill. We are assuming
that their perceived skill comes instead from effort.
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— Formally trained personnel in a clinic These practitioners have some formal train-
ing and work in a facility that has a basic drug supply, beds, IV equipment and a
delivery room but not much more.
— Highly trained personnel in a hospital These practitioners have advanced for-
mal training and practice in a hospital with a much greater supply of drugs and
equipment for surgery, long term care, etc. General practitioners would also be
expected to have reasonable access to the services or advice of specialists.
Variance of Outcomes o^
The range of possible outcomes.
Scores of 0 (low) to 10 (high) were used for all scales. Since the analysis is sensitive
to the scores given to each case we had 2 doctors and one nurse (all experienced in rural
tropical medicine) score all the cases using the definitions above. We found that our
scoring correlated better with the other three than any of the other three correlated with
the others - ours was a median of sorts. Therefore we perform the analysis with our scores
that are justified and documented in Leonard (1997).
In Figure 1 we show how a variety of disease examples fall into the grid of responsive-
nesses to effort. Keep in mind that the full model examines variations in disease severity
and the medical skill needed as well whereas this figure treats these as constant. (Over-
laying this grid is the division into choices of providers for the average individual at the
average skill and severity of disease from the structural estimation). It is an important
feature of this model that one can predict that certain health care practitioners will see
some types of diseases more frequently than others. In fact there are recognizable patterns
in the types of conditions reported at all centers and this theory is an explanation for such
patterns as well as a method of predicting them.
3.5 Organizational Quality Factor
We estimate (jfc by an aggregation of disease characteristics, z^. Thus £jfc = ^2nHi • Zki,
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Figure 1: Two dimensional projection of disease characteristics
effort, the variance of the outcome, the product of responsiveness and variance and the
skill of a provider at a hospital.
4 Empirical analysis
We know the characteristics of the disease and now proceed to solve for the parameters of
the non-cooperative game that produces a pattern of choices that best resembles the actual
pattern of choices. The empirical estimation is similar to the McFadden conditional logit
in that we estimate one vector of coefficients for all individuals and choices (practitioners).
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Recall the model; when Kj = 0 or traditional healers.
(((1 - rjk)ak)a«
( ( W *) 7 * ((1 - rjk) a*)1
E(U") = (<ji%a*7r,-*'ft)'-at-7*
(1 -r,**)t1-
V 7 * P ((1 - r;*') a*)'1"7*') ^ ^ ) - (/Cj + dc* +icy)
When rjk = 0 or organizational providers
And for all providers 10
patient efficiency rji = \^Ei -en
l
opportunity cost of healthy time U{ = J ^ Wm • W
m
organizational quality factor £fc = ^ Hn • Zk
responsiveness to medical effort 7* = B2 • 7*
responsiveness to patient effort a^ = B2 • a^
o
provider skill TT = ( 7 ^ ) 3
We observe the characteristics of the disease, %, o^, itjk, cr^, the characteristics of the
individual, W{, ej, the fixed cost, fcj, drug costs dcjk, travel costs, tcjj, and the choice of
practitioner, S. Costs and incomes are in CFA 1,000
10We multiply the responsiveness by a factor because a test of B2 = 0 is a test that efforts are not
significant in the determination of outcome (B2 = 0 implies fj, = 1). On the other hand we raise skill to a
power because B3 = 0 implies that skill is invariant across practitioners.
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Using a maximum likelihood patterned on the McFadden Conditional Logit we estimate
the following parameters; the penalty basis for the mission centers, i^mi8Sion, and the penalty
basis for hospitals i^ hospitai (we fix the penalty basis for government clinics at 1); the
parameters for the aggregation of r)i, E; the parameters for the aggregation of £&, H] the
parameters for the aggregation of uji, W; the factor for responsiveness, B2; the exponent
for skill, B3; and the standard deviation of utility B111.
fjjfc*, a and 6 are endogenously determined.
The likelihood is formed as follows.
exp(Cfy)
*? ~~
Where 6{j = 1 when provider j was chosen and 0 otherwise.
Using a Newton-Raphson algorithm we maximize the log-likelihood, solving for the
optimal sharing rule within each evaluation of the likelihood.
The asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimated parameters (B) is estimated from
the variance matrix of the first derivative vector.
PC)]"1-
- 1
where g{ = ?-}& (24)
Where k is the log likelihood for each observation. We approximate §i by finite differences.
As a check on the validity of the conditional logit we performed a conditional probit
estimation with a simulated multivariate normal distribution. The results are reported
in Appendix B. Each estimated coefficient except the error of the utility is contained
within 1 standard deviation of the conditional logit estimate. This suggests that, given
the structural form of utility, our choice of conditional logit is relatively robust.
11
 We can determine the magnitude of the error term because the coefficient for costs is set to 1.
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4.1 Results
The estimated coefficients and their corresponding z-tests are reported in Table 1.
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The likelihood ratio test of the restriction that Ui, 77$, and ^ are explained only by
constant terms (all coefficients W, E, and H other than the constant terms are equal to
zero) is rejected with a p-value of less than 0.00001 (LR = 54 with 16 df).
Individual tests of significance on the weekly wage and the family income for non-
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workers (Wi, W2) fail to reject the hypothesis that they are equal to zero. The LR of the
test of the joint hypothesis that W\ = W2 = 0 is rejected at a p-value of 0.0963 (LR =
4.66 with 2 df). Individual income or family wealth play a role in the determination of
the opportunity cost of time, but we do not have strong evidence of the manner in which
the opportunity cost of healthy time varies across individuals.
We can reject the hypothesis that effort at organizational providers is constant, varying
between but not within centers (LR test of all H except constant equal to zero rejected with
p-value < 0.0001; LR = 33.76 with 4 df). We can also reject the hypothesis that efforts do
not vary between centers as both the mission penalty basis and the hospital penalty basis
are significantly different from zero (where zero would imply equality with the government
clinic). The model's estimates imply that a protocol violation committed at a government
hospital would result in a punishment of over twice the expected value of the punishment
that would result if the same violation had been committed at a government clinic. This
could come from either an increased frequency of monitoring, or an increased penalty
when a violation is detected. A mission clinic punishes the same violation at about 154%
of the expected value of a violation at a government clinic. The expected value of the
punishment for a violation at a mission hospital is 2.62 (1 + 0.54 + 1.08) times greater
than at a government clinic. We believe that the majority of the increased penalty basis at
hospitals over clinics (.Khospitai) comes from increased monitoring (hospitals are all in major
towns) and that the majority of the increased penalty basis at mission centers (i^ miSSiOn)
comes from increased sanctions or decreased bonuses.
The joint test that all coefficients E\ through E\Q are zero is rejected with a p-value
of 0.002 (LR = 27.66, 10 df). Age is clearly an important determinant of the ability of
a patient to transform health into health care both for the patient and for the person
responsible for the patient. We had included this second individual to try and capture
some of the dynamic of patient-practitioner interactions. Patients can improve their
chance of recovery both during the examination and during the treatment. A person with
a higher level of education would be more able, and might feel freer, to interact with
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appears that if there is a disadvantage to being a woman in the search for good health care
it comes from this interaction (almost all practitioners are male). Students and farmers
appear at a disadvantage and the small number of businessmen and civil servants (mostly
retired) in our sample are at a great advantage in the search for health care.
The factor for responsivenesses is clearly significant though that for skill is not. This
could be caused by any of three things. Skill might not matter in the search for health care
(something we consider unlikely), or patients might not value skill in the same manner
as practitioners (codings were done from a medical perspective) or our codings were too
crude to capture this effect properly. Given the p-value of 0.19 corresponding to the z-test,
suggesting some, but not overwhelming confidence in the coefficient, we think the third of
these explanations is the most likely.
a, 6 and rjk* are solved endogenously. b has no natural scale but a does, a for the
traditional healer is solved by determining the willingness to exert effort in return for com-
pensation measured in money terms. Assuming that traditional healers and organizational
providers face the same disutility functions we can assign a scale to all providers efforts.
The variance of effort provided at traditional healers is higher at organizational providers
because it depends on characteristics of the patient as well as characteristics of the disease.
Table 2 shows the advantage that traditional healers hold over other providers. Though
they have lower levels of skill, they exert much higher levels of effort on the behalf of their
patients. This result parallels in the comments of patients in focus group interviews who
repeatedly pointed out that traditional healers took the time to properly examine them.
For a visit to a government center, practitioners exert effort for which they expect to be
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compensated on average 940 CFA at a clinic and 1,900 CFA at a hospital. The respective
median compensations were 530 CFA and 1,100 CFA. We point out these numbers because
we have prior beliefs about their range. The expected compensations (or disutilities)
compare to fees of 100 CFA at clinics and 600 CFA at hospitals. Clearly the fees are much
smaller than the effort exerted, but the fees were never intended to cover costs. We note
that in another sub-division in which we performed a pre-test of this survey, government
centers were supposed to be free, but informally fees were required. The fees charged varied
from clinic to clinic, but based on patient declaration of what they paid we estimate that
the fees were at least 500 CFA at clinics and often as high as 1,000 CFA. Since fees were
set by practitioners their magnitude can be expected to carry more information about
expected compensations and they appear to be consistent with the compensations the
model predicts.
The share of value paid to traditional healers varied between 32% and 70%. The value
of the average predicted payment to traditional healers was 44,000 CFA. This is skewed
by a few large payments with the largest being 857,000 CFA (about 430 USD). We did
not observe any payments of this magnitude in the survey. However, we believe it is not
an unreasonable result because we only observed payments that were made at the most
1 month after the beginning of treatment. Interviews with healers and patients suggest
that only a small portion of payments are made in such a short period of time. Indeed
the largest payment we heard of in interviews with healers was that of two cows for a
previously barren woman who gave birth and that payment was presented on the seventh
birthday of the child. The value of two cows easily contains our maximum estimated
payment.
That the predicted payments to traditional healers and the required compensations
of government practitioners are well within the range of our priors, when we included no
mechanism in the estimation to bind them, is taken as a sign of confidence in our results.
The average value of a visit (before taking into account that patients choose the
provider with the maximum benefit) was about 38,000 CFA or 17 USD. The value of
health care is more extensively investigated in the following section. At the margin we
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calculate that 100 CFA worth of effort on the part of a practitioner at government clinics
is worth 1,600 CFA to the median patient. At government hospitals 100 CFA worth of
effort is worth 900 CFA to the median patient. This is a direct result of unobservable
efforts.
This gap between the cost of quality health care and its value suggests an opportunity
for side-payments. Indeed many government-run health services unofficially require side-
payments. However there is no sense among among consumers that we spoke to that
quality is better at centers that require side-payments whereas they all believe quality
is higher at mission centers. If there is imperfect information in the provision of health
care then this observation should be expected. When the outcome is unverifiable there is
no credible contract for the provision of quality health care that is not backed up by the
threat of penalty by a super-principal. Side-payments do purchase unobservable effort.
We do not investigate the role of side-payments in this work, but we cite one interesting
result from a work on similar data from the same area. Ndeso-Atanga (forthcoming) has
shown that patients are willing to pay a premium to visit mission health centers with
one exception: child delivery at clinics and hospitals. Patients always pay the attending
physician or nurse an 'appreciation' when the delivery is successful. A birth is one of the
few medical 'interventions' whose result can be immediately assessed. The outcome is
verifiable and it appears that side-payments do increase quality for this one service.
5 Simulation of Possible Government Policies
Though this paper takes a novel look at traditional healers we do not see them as the
answer to the serious deficiencies in the provision of health care in rural Africa. The in-
stitution of traditional medicine invokes truth-telling in a way that modern providers can
never replicate. Therefore contingent-payment contracts cannot be introduced in organi-
zational health care. Furthermore attempts by the government to use traditional healers
as their representatives are likely to break down the institution of traditional medicine,
not extend it. However we study two institutions, not just one. The institution of tradi-
tional medicine was investigated to illuminate its contrasting institution, that of modern
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medicine. In this section we look at various possible government policies to improve the
quality and accessibility of health care and show that the government can make great
strides by recognizing the value of the institution within which it must operate.
The population of the sub-division was listed in 1993 as 100,010 people. Our survey
reached 4,484 people, or about 5% of the population. If we weight according to our
sampling method we have interviewed randomly in villages representing 67,527 people, or
67% of the population. To create a sample representative of the sub-division, we weight
the survey and then multiply by 1.5. Thus we estimate that 11,817 people made first visits
to one of the five providers we are studying.
We assume everyone in our sample acted rationally but 2 major sources of inefficiency
remain. The first is that travel costs are transaction costs; they are paid by patients, but
they are not recuperated by practitioners and they purchase no skill, drugs or effort. For
travels to local clinics and hospitals this is a minor consideration, but for travels to mission
hospitals this is a significant cost. A government policy which increases the probability of
visits to local clinics and hospitals over mission hospitals will allow patients to save travel
costs and will increase the net social benefit of health care.
The second source of inefficiency is the subject of this work, imperfect information
in the supply of factor inputs. Were health care bought and sold on an open market
we would expect the marginal benefit and cost of medical effort to be equal. Since the
patient cannot purchase the marginal unit of health care, the inefficiency remains. If the
government can increase the amount of effort supplied at anywhere near its opportunity
cost the net benefit to society could be quite large.
We examine in this section a few simple policy measures and their predicted affect on
the health and utility of the population of the sub-division.
5.1 Base R u n
The empirical estimation produces a probability of a visit to any given provider. In a
sample of 100 people identical to the interviewed individual the number who are likely to
visit any particular provider is equal to the probability of a visit to that provider times
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100. Thus from the probabilities we can estimate the proportion of the sample who will
visit any given provider.





















































































































Table 3 shows three different estimates of patterns of visits for five subgroups of the
population. The groups include the entire population, women, infants (under 5 years
of age), the poor (lowest quartile according to household wealth), and the most remote
(upper quartile of distance to a organizational provider). We chose these groups because
they represent populations that might be targeted by government policy. Shown in the
table are the proportion of visits predicted by the model, the observed pattern of visits
and the pattern for the whole population of the sub-division predicted by the model. The
sample and sub-division estimates are different because the survey under-sampled residents
of big villages who are more likely to have lower travel costs or have a government clinic
or hospital present in the village itself.
The predictions follow the observed data relatively well, though the predictions for
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infants are disappointing. We re-ran the model including a dummy variable for infants in
the calculation of the efficiency of the patient at transforming health inputs into health
care. This improved the overall number of correct predictions (comparing the model to the
sample) from 40% to 43% and improved the model's prediction of visits for children12. The
results suggest that infants have a higher efficiency than other individuals and therefore
visit government clinics more than other individuals because they are able to do more with
the care they receive there. This could be because the illnesses from which they suffer
are easier to cure with known treatments. Certainly medical evidence would suggest this,
but it should have been captured in the characteristics of the disease reported. The
result for infants suggests that our attempt to measure the characteristics of diseases is
lacking, especially with respect to children. We choose to acknowledge the shortcomings
of our data rather than include dummy variables that, though they help our predictions
(though not the likelihood), circumvent the spirit of the model. The overall predictions
are close enough to the observed patterns that we can justify the use of the model for
policy analysis13.
The base run to which we compare the results of our policy simulations is the results
for the population of the sub-division. The schema reported in Table 3 gives the total
number of visits expected to any given provider by patients in Mbonge sub-division in a
month.





































Table 4 shows the average utility or net benefit from health care14. The net benefit
12LR ratio test of the restriction that the coefficient of the additional dummy variable is equal to zero
fails to reject the null (LR = 1.46, 1 df, p-value = 0.22).
13Note, that since the model under-predicts visits to government clinics and the policies we examine
attempt to improve government centers we will be under-estimating the benefit to children.
14 Utility is not strictly aggregable across individuals because, though we know the value of health care
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represents the total utility from health care for an average individual. Thus the average
visit to a mission hospital results in 52,000 CFA worth of increased earning potential
(about 104 USD), despite higher drug costs, travel costs and fixed fees. Note that this is
not the benefit to the average individual of visiting a mission hospital, but the benefit to
the average individual who decides to visit a mission hospital.
subgroup II healer
Table 5: Base Run: Provider Efforts










Table 5 shows the average level of effort exerted by each practitioner. These figures
can also be read in terms of 1,000 CFA. We look at effort in the base run because policies
will change the amount of effort exerted, and this additional effort must be compensated.
For traditional healers effort is compensated by the patient, but practitioners at govern-
ment and mission clinics and hospitals must be compensated by their employer. For the
policies we examine the only relevant change in effort (requiring compensation) is that of
government centers.
5.2 Price (Fees and Drug Cost) Based Policies
Reducing fees collected or the cost of drugs, though often debated, is not a financially
feasible policy for cash-strapped African governments. However there is a strong belief
that, if it were possible, it would be one of the most effective ways to transfer resources
to the rural poor and disadvantaged. We examine this policy here to show that it is not
superior to other policies that are financially feasible.
5.2.1 Reducing Fees at Government Centers
The first policy which we examine is that of eliminating the fixed fees at government
centers. Since the fees fall further at hospitals this increases the percentage of visits to
compared to observed expenditures, we do not know how these utilities relate across individuals. However
aggregation is necessary for simplicity of exposition.
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Table 6: Reduced Fees at Government Centers: Pattern of Visits


































government hospitals (see Table 6). The fees are a small portion of the total costs to
patients (after drug costs and then travel costs) and therefore the total change in the
pattern of visits is small.
5.2.2 Reducing Drug Costs at Government Centers
The government could also choose to reduce drug costs at government centers (both clinics
and hospitals). This would have the largest affect at hospitals where the drugs are more
expensive to begin with. Reducing drug costs by 50% causes visits to government hospitals
to increase by 8%. The change in the pattern of visits is similar across groups with the
greatest benefit going to the remote (see Table 7).
Table 7: Reduce Drug Prices at Government Centers: Pattern of Visits
subgroup II healer gov clinic gov hosp | mis clinic mis hosp































The major cost of such a policy is the cost of supplying drugs. If we assume that the
price originally charged was equal to the cost then the government has to make up the
difference in price for every unit sold. The average subsidy at a government clinic will be
2,225 CFA per visit and we predict 3,207 visits to government clinics with the new policy
or a cost of 7,136,000 CFA for clinics. The average subsidy for a visit to a government
hospital is 5,981 CFA per visit and we predict 3,560 visits to hospitals at an expected cost
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of 21,292,000 CFA. The total cost to subsidize drugs is 28,428,000 CFA.
The change in utility per patient is recorded in Table 8. The total benefit to the
population of this policy is 29,497,000 CFA.





















































The extra effort exerted by practitioners at government hospitals is large because they
are seeing so many extra patients. The compensation required is on the order of 1,900,000
CFA (see Table 9).
Table 9: Halve Drug Prices at Government Centers: Effort










The costs of the policy are conservatively estimated at 30 million CFA and the benefits
are estimated at 30 million, or a cost benefit ratio of approximately 1:1. This is not
necessarily a bad ratio if the goal is to transfer resources to vulnerable populations, but
it must be compared to the benefit cost ratio of other possible policies. The investigation
of this policy alternative does not take into account the difficulty of ensuring consistent
supply of a subsidized good, especially in the rural areas. If history is a guide, decreasing
the cost will decrease the supply in clinics and most hospitals.
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5.3 Quality (Incentive) Based Policies
Reducing costs at government health centers can reduce transaction costs by reducing the
amount of time spent traveling. However the responsiveness of patient demand to reduced
costs is low, because costs are being reduced at low quality centers, and cost and quality
are poor substitutes. Quality at hospitals is higher, but government hospitals have much
higher travel costs than clinics. To recapture the potential benefit lost to transaction
costs the government would have to address the gap between the benefit to health care of
provider effort and the cost of providing that effort.
In this section we examine the benefit of improving quality through the instrument of
this investigation, the penalty for providing sub-standard services.
5.3.1 Increasing Government Penalty in Case of sub-standard performance
We consider a policy that changes the way health care is delivered at government centers,
an increase in the penalty at government centers by 40%. This would bring the expected
penalty closer to that of mission centers by 75%. We assume that the cost of this policy
is the increased salary necessary to compensate government employees for the extra effort
they are required to exert. In this area of Cameroun the government is already gathering
the information required to assess quality.
Table 10: Increase Penalty at Government Centers: Pattern of Visits
subgroup II healer gov clinic I gov hosp mis clinic mis hosp































The pattern of visits changes the most for government clinics and it appears they
are drawing most of their clients from mission clinics (see Table 10). There are more
government clinics than mission clinics so this policy is similar to reducing the travel cost
to higher quality climes.
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The utility of the patient increases and the remote benefiting the most (see Table 11).
The total increase in benefit to the sub-division is 11,496,000 CFA.



















Increasing the penalty clearly increases the amount of effort that practitioners at gov-
ernment clinics and hospitals must provide. This increased effort must be compensated.
Table 12 shows an estimated compensation required of 2,653,000 CFA.
The costs of this policy are estimated to be on the order of 2.6 million CFA and the
benefits on the order of 11 million CFA, a cost benefit ratio of approximately 1:4. This is
clearly superior, even for vulnerable populations, than policies that subsidize costs without
addressing quality.
5.3.2 Increasing incentives and fees
It is not necessary that the government incur any expenses in its efforts to increase quality.
Many studies have shown that patients are willing to pay more for better quality. This pa-
per explicitly addresses the odd fact that, in a country where side-payments are common,
patients cannot unilaterally pay for better quality. When there is imperfect information
and unverifiable outcomes institutions must insure quality before patients will be willing
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to pay. The policy we examine makes the role of institutions in increasing quality explicit.
The government must enforce the standards that it already has in place.
We examine here a policy in which the fees at clinics rise to 300 CFA (from 100 CFA)
and the cost of hospitals rise to 1200 CFA (from 600 CFA). The penalty (or frequency of
monitoring) rises by 40% in both centers.
Table 13: Increase penalty and fees at government centers: Pattern of Visits
subgroup II healer I gov clinic gov hosp I mis clinic mis hosp































This policy increases the number of visits to government climes and hospitals (see
Table 13). Again the most remote exhibit the greatest change in the pattern of visits.





















































The utilities are recorded in Table 14. Again the most remote benefit the most on
average, but it is important to note that every vulnerable group benefits from this policy
despite the increased fees. The total benefit to the sub-division is 9,645,000 CFA.
The increase in the effort of practitioners is slightly smaller than in the simulation
where penalties were raised without increasing fees because the response of patients is less
when the fees are higher.
36



















The costs of this policy is the increased compensation required by practitioners but
now these costs can be met by the increased fees We deliberately created this policy so
that the increase in fees would approximately compensate the practitioners15. Without
any new government expenditures this policy benefits the entire population including the
four vulnerable groups.
This particular policy is important in the debate over decentralization. Increased fees
are collected at centers according to the increase in quality at that center. This policy
does not require that the fees be centrally collected and then paid out again to the centers.
The fees can remain in the center where they would compensate the practitioners at that
center. However, there is a very important role for the government: the penalty must be
enforced. The institution is the difference between centers requiring side-payments but
not producing better quality, and centers collecting higher fees and selling quality health
care.
6 Conclusion
Imperfect information in the supply of inputs introduces transaction costs to the market
for health care. In Cameroun two basic forms of institution have arisen to solve these
problems. Traditional healers have low levels of skill but operate within an institution
that allows them to operate on a contingent-payment contract basis. This allows them to
provide health care to a niche of the market that is able to substitute skill for high levels of
effort. Organizational providers, on the other hand, operate in an environment in which the
15Originally clinics received 3,129 visits and would therefore collect 626,000 CFA in additional fees from
these visitors as well as 293 new visits earning 300 CFA each (88,000 CFA). Originally hospitals received
2,559 visits and would now collect an additional 600 CFA from each or 1,535,000 CFA. They also receive
51 additional visits earning 1,200 CFA each (61,000 CFA). The total in new fees collected is therefore
approximately 2,310,000 CFA.
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budget of value created by health care can be broken, allowing them to achieve potentially
superior solutions. We argue that, mission organizations take greater advantage of the
opportunities created by budget-breaking than do government organizations. By explicitly
defining the role of institutions in the market for imperfectly supplied inputs we show how
changes in government policy can reduce the transaction cost associated with seeking
quality health care.
We have fit a relatively simple model to data collected in Cameroun. We show that
patients choose practitioners in part because the demand for unobservable inputs resulting
from the conditions under which they suffer leads them to the contract that appropriately
supplies those inputs. This is precisely what patients say in focus group interviews; their
choice of provider depends on what disease they think they have. The model fits well
and produces results that are in line with our prior expectations. Similarly our policy
recommendations parallel the collected wisdom in the field. It is impossible to show that
any structural estimation is econometrically superior to all other possible structural forms.
Rather, we show that, with a few important theoretical assumptions, we can reproduce the
observed choices of patients, the payments to traditional healers and the compensations
practitioners expect within the confines of a rigorous framework.
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A Proof of proposition 2
We simplify Uj/i to \i without loss of generality for simplicity of exposition. The lagrangian
is formed as follows;
. d d)
Using the envelope condition we solve for the change in utility with respect to a change
in the sharing rule.
dL . d . d
or da do
differentiating the lagrangian with respect to a and b we solve for the two multipliers.




d d , d
and it should be clear that limr^o\2 = 0. This makes sense since all of the incentives to
provide effort lie with the patient when the sharing rule is equal to zero the cost of the
incentive compatibility constraint is smaller and smaller. However Ai does not go to zero
as r goes to zero.
(1 T)—J
Substituting both multipliers into the envelope condition we find
This condition is positive given that there are increasing marginal costs to effort. Note
that the system is not solvable if this is not the case. Thus as r approaches zero there is
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a benefit to increasing r. Note that this does not rely on any assumptions about the sign
of the cross partial of output with respect to a and 6.
B Simulated Normal Distribution
The conditional probit with simulated normal is solved by adding to each expected utility
1,000 normally distributed errors and taking as the probability, the number of times the
expected utility of a choice is greater than all others, divided by 1,000. The maximum
likelihood is found by a simplex algorithm.
Table 16 shows the coefficient of the conditional probit, the coefficient of the conditional
logit, the standard error of the conditional logit and the number of standard deviations
between the two estimated sets of coefficients.









































































































^mission (mission penalty basis)




Ei family wealth (In)
E2 age
E3 age2
E4 gender (female =1)
E5 student
E6 farmer
E7 businessman or civil servant
E8 age




W2 (family income for non-workers)
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